A Knowledge Argument for Time, Elaborated

A Knowledge Argument for Time, Elaborated

I will quote from TIME TRAVEL AND THE FLOW OF TIME by Bradley Monton at the University of Colorado at Boulder. "[Two] Theories of Time [are] A-Theory (presentism, growing block, moving spotlight) vs. B-Theory (eternalism)

Eternalism holds that:

(a) there is no objective flow of time

(b) time is a dimension like the dimensions of space

(c) present, past, and future are only indexical; there are no objective tensed facts"

Now consider the ontological Knowledge Argument, which was originally stated:

"Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘The sky is blue’.… What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false." (Jackson 1982, quoted from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/ )

Compare Mary with Mark:

"Mark is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a block universe via a block-universe's clock. He specializes in the neurophysiology of the perception of time and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical (block/eternalist) information there is to obtain about what goes on when we experience the present, or plan for the future, and use terms like ‘temporal flow’, ‘past’, and so on. He discovers, for example, just how long Caesium hyperfine transitions are (the basis of atomic clocks), and exactly how this produces the coordination of cyclic brain processes and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘I am in the present and time is flowing’.… What will happen when Mark is released from his block universe (at, say, t = 10 min.) into a presentist (or even growing block) universe or is given a moving spotlight monitor? Will he learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that he will learn something about the world and our temporal experience of it. But then is it inescapable that his previous knowledge was incomplete. But he had all the physical (block/eternalist) information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Eternalism is false."

The main responses to Mary are

1. she already knew what it is like to experience blue (qualiaphobes)

2. she acquired a new mode of information

3. she learned something new (qualiaphiles)

The main responses to Mark would seem to be

1. he already knew what it is like to experience time

2. he acquired a new mode of information

3. he learned something new

My own preference is for (3). (I would even take the more extreme position that time is an instance of qualia.) Of course, I don't expect everyone to have the same inclination. But I would hope that arguments and tools used to understand Mary can be applied to Mark, and vice versa. 

getting only negative feedback makes it difficult to continue

Defn of Presentism

Presentism is at least that among the pearls on the necklace only one pearl is present and the others are not present.

A Knowledge Argument for Time

The (ontological) knowledge argument: Mary knows all the physical facts knowable concerning human color vision before her release from a black-and-white room. Upon release she experiences color, e.g. a tree with green leaves, for the first time and says 'wow!'. The question is did Mary acquire any new information upon release?

"It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information possible. Ergo there is more to have than that, and (a type of) Physicalism is false." (to paraphrase how it's put in the Stanford Encyclopedia http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/.

The parallel temporal argument: Xerxes knows all the knowable facts concerning time before his release from a block-world room. Upon release he experiences 1. an ontologically privileged present, and 2. temporal flow, for the first time, and says 'wow!'. The question is did Xerxes acquire any new information upon release?

Clearly most B-theorists and Block-worlder's would answer 'no', paralleling Materialists, and most A-theorists and Presentists would answer 'yes' paralleling Dualists.

Guess who THIS is!

Four Parameters of a Temporal Theory

Four parameters of a temporal theory (Kehler, informal) 1. Ontology: presentist, growing block, eternalist, 2. Tense: A-series, B-series, R-series, 3. Sub/Rel: substantivalism, relationalism, 4. Per/End perdurantism, endurantism 

Gone for a week of time.

Contextual Ontology Bookkeeping

Let an anchored ontology be one in which the only frames of reference (from which laws must hold) are anchored by "objects" x, y, z, ... Each anchor describes (or interacts with) some of the other "objects" in the ontology via the classical laws of physics, probabilistic quantum laws, logical truths, or whatever... An anchored, contextual ontology is more parsimonious than a classical ontology because 1. there is no disembodied frame of reference from which everything must be true 2. not all anchors describe/interact with all the other anchors.

Let (x_y) mean x behaves lawfully (even if only probabilistically) or logically, in the terms of the frame of reference of (anchor) y. In a universe with only one "object", x, there is only

1) (x_x)

In a contextual ontology like quantum realism the set x-union-y may behave differently from the single composite system x-and-y. So the possibilities for a universe as above with two "objects" x and y is given by a 3x3 table

2)

here e.g. y_x is the collection of physical laws that y must satisfy in x's frame of reference. And e.g.,  

just means that from the frame of reference of the combined system x-and-y object y behaves according to various laws and rules L₁, L₂, ... If there is no relation or set of laws, then

For 3 "objects" the table is 7x7, for 4 it is 15x15, etc...

All the information in the universe is given by the elements in the table and relations among the elements in the table, e.g.

denotes whatever physical/logical laws z must obey from the perspective of the combined system (x-and-y-and-w), the values of the same laws about w from the perspective of (y-and-z) is 3i(n)² as large.  

A case that I predict is going to become important is where two different anchors have ontologically independent notions of time, in which case there is not a simultaneous state of the anchors. 

"Perhaps we should take seriously the possibility of time's consisting of multiple time streams, each one of which is isolated from each other, so that every moment of time stands in temporal relations to other moments in its own time stream, but does not bear any temporal relations to any moment from another time stream." (Markosian, N., "Time", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#TopTim )

can't form the set {a, b}

If there is a thing a and a thing b, then forming the mathematical set {a, b} requires several ontological assumptions, not all of which are sound in a contextual ontology.

more later...

Here's a new possibility for the topology of time

Suppose the further back in time one goes the more likely it is one is dropped back in to the future.

A first moment at t = 0 is impossible to get back to since one gets probabilistically, randomly, dropped back to the future where (when) one just came from (you get to keep the memories of your attempts to go back in time).

So going back in time would be like: 1. going back in time, 2. getting kicked back to some time away from t = 0. In our spaceship we note 'we've just been here...' 3. going back again, 4. probabilistically dropped back out to the future again, repeat.

Note: this idea was motivated by quantum mechanics, but I'm not claiming it's true, just that it's interesting.

toy quantum mechanics

If I lift my coffee cup and then tilt it I can drink my coffee. If I tilt the cup and then lift it I get coffee spilled all over me.

This non-commutativity is surely useful in a toy model of quantum mechanics.

the logic of belief in G

Suppose the logic of belief in G is like the logic of "this statement is true".

Motivating Existence via Quantum Realism

Suppose universe codifies all truths about the universe. Suppose we have an explanation e1 for universe. Then we need an explanation e2 for e1, and another explanation e3 for e2, etc... in a sequence that has no associated limit ordinal (i.e. the sequence doesn't come to an end). Granting all that, the problem one runs in to is

(1) where does the entire set s = {universe, e1, e2, ...} come from?

But the assumption here is each of universe, e1, e2, ... are able to be the elements of a set, s. That's not necessarily the case in a contextual ontology, such as Quantum Realists' understanding of quantum mechanics.

In a contextual ontology there may not be any disembodied god-like perspective or frame of reference from which one may make the assumption that universe, e1, e2, ... can be members of a single set. In some kinds of contextual ontologies there may be nothing which s exists relative to, in which case it would not exist, in which case (1) is not a sound objection to the idea of an infinite series of explanations.

Contextual ontologies allow for a non-well-defined physical state of the universe as a whole.

Quantum mechanics has a contextual ontology known as Quantum Realism. If Relationalism is part of Quantum Realism, there isn't any physically well-defined state of the universe in its entirety. In such a universe there is no fact of the matter about the entire universe taken as a whole. There are only physical facts from various frames of reference. In such a universe it might be that every subsystem has an explanation as the description of a previous quantum state (previous explanation?). Suppose every explanation lies within a quantum description...

[note to self: look at structures like universe = {quantum explanation, universe}]

I admit to being unclear about the interactions of 2) physical stuff, 3) physical theory, 4) explanations of (1) and/or (2), 5) explanations of (3), etc. Do we need physical stuff to be ultimately mathematical? Do we need explanations to happen only within the universe they are explaining?

Quantum mechanics in some ways lightens the load of what we have to explain (and this would be a very strong reason there is Quantum mechanics and not some other mechanics).

In a contextual ontology there may not be any God-like "disembodied" frame of reference. Normally the objects of the ontology are the only frames of reference from which things about the universe must be true, and explained. Usually, these frames of reference don't existentially coexist with all the other things in the universe, but only a subset. The upshot is the universe doesn't need to be explained in toto. We only need explanations for (the existence of and/or particularities of) some things, from each frame of reference. This is a big reduction of work an explanation must do.

If objection (1) is the only objection against an infinite series of explanations being sound, then

(6) it may be there is an infinite series of explanations of the existence of and/or particulars of our universe

The objection (1) might not apply in a quantum universe.

I'll reiterate from several previous posts that the principle that makes our universe more likely to exist (the Parfit Selector) is, for various reasons, the logical form

(7) 

Where T is the universe. This logical structure can be looked for in the equations of physics. (Two interesting interpretational points are time and probability.)

Meetings about WhyThere'sAnything

A WhyIsThereAnything conference was held at Yale Oct. 2011. I watched all 15-ish hours of video of the conference (http://whyisthereanything.org/pictures-and-video).

It wasn't until about hour 13 that anybody mentioned the Parfit Selector!! (it's anything that increases the likelihood that our universe exists). Can you believe that?? They should have STARTED with it and related notions, and gone on from there.

What they did borders on the unethical. That kind of thing makes me crazy.

Rutgers has a What There Is and Why There Is Anything group (http://philocosmology.rutgers.edu/our-blog).

The fact of the matter is readers of this blog are ahead of researchers in both the conference and the group in certain areas. See previous posts.

i.e. what's the Parfit Selector?

i.e. what's the Parfit Selector?

What need does the universe fulfill?

What are the logical principles or constraints that the actual universe maximizes?

What collection of terms and principles make the existence of the universe the most logical thing?

Quantum Realism implies what?

The Outline.

What does Quantum Realism imply for the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of time?

Quantum Realism

1. a whole is greater than the sum of its parts

2. the value of a measurement is dependent on the measurement context

3. Relationalism: a state is relative to which system is doing the measuring

4. non-locality (which isn't a problem)

The philosophy of mind: Dualism, Materialism, Qualia-ism

Dualism: there is the physical and there is the mental, and they are tightly correlated. If a single irreducible quale q is correlated to a single irreducible quantum system s, the number of possible subjective states increases wildly as the number of subsystems (by (1)) increases.

(Double-Aspectism (Chalmers:) is a mature form of Dualism: the physical and qualia are two aspects of one kind of underlying stuff.)

Materialism: everything, including all subjective experience, is identical to a collection of physical entities in some configuration.

Qualia-ism: everything, including all "objects", are identical to a collection of qualia in some configuration.

The philosophy of time: A-series, B-series

I don't know.

The physical laws of our universe, together with its initial low-entropy state, may be more probable than a universe with different physical laws but a higher-entropy initial state.

The physical laws of our universe, together with its initial low-entropy state, may be more probable than a universe with different physical laws but a higher-entropy initial state.

a response to Realism and Objectivism in Quantum Mechanics by Vassilios Karakostas

Notes for the Quantum Realist

a response to Realism and Objectivism in Quantum Mechanics by Vassilios Karakostas, Forthcoming in Journal for General Philosophy of Science 2012 (Vol. 43, Issue 1). Available at: http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1007/s10838-012-9173-5&cm_mmc=event-_-articleAuthor-_-onlineFirst-_-0

Let there be quantum subsystems S₁, S₂, and supposed they've interacted. Then

1) what is real for the measuring apparatus is no longer S₁ and S₂, but a third quantum system S₃

If S₁ and S₂ are represented by vectors on Hilbert spaces H_S1 and H_S2, respectively, after interaction S₃ is represented by a vector on 

If {p_i} are all of the properties of S₁ and {p_j} are all of the properties of S₂, then S₃ has strictly more properties than all of {p_i} and {p_j} together.

Kochen-Specker yields one kind of contextuality

2) from a selection of possible measurements, some "properties" depend for their values on which of the measurements are eventually preformed (Kochen-Specker)

these are properties of the single combined quantum system - measuring apparatus.

I would add another kind of contextuality, Relationalism. What is real for the measuring apparatus is S₃. At the same time,

3) in a frame of reference in which the singlet particles have not yet interacted, S₃ is not real

I'd also add

4) for the Realist, reality is non-local. However, non-locality in this specific sense is not problematic. A pair of particles in the singlet state must, buy (1) above, be thought of as a single third system S_singlet, not the first particle system and the second particle system. Then, the relevant generalization of the Kochen-Specker theorem shows that this third system S_singlet does not posses the property of location-in-space-at-this-moment, before measurement by the measuring apparatus. As a result, one can't think of S_singlet as being contained within all of space, at this moment. There's nothing wrong with this if "space" is just the order relation of quantum interactions: it just means S_singlet hasn't interacted with the measuring apparatus yet, in a measurement on a Hilbert space in which one can express location.

[note to self: qualia are not usually thought of as being contained within all of 3rd-person space.]

What is an electron?

What is an electron?

This is where I'm at:

1. it apparently has some definite-valued properties independently of the measuring apparatus: mass, total spin, total angular momentum, charge, ...

2. it has some properties before observation that are dependent on the measuring apparatus: location, momentum, energy, x-spin, ... amplitudes. These amplitudes are the maximum amount of physical information, from the apparatus' perspective, between the electron and the apparatus.

3. it acquires properties, in the guise of definite values for amplitudes, only upon observation by the apparatus

for the A-series by Sullivan

An argument for the A-series:

"

1. We often experience objects as of having many spatial parts and a rich and varied spatial extent. For example, meeting me for the first time you will likely experience me as an object composed of many, many different spatial parts. You will be able to tell at a glance roughly how tall I am and the intricate pattern of colors on my shirt.
2. We do not experience objects as of having many temporal parts or a rich and varied temporal extent. Meeting me for the first time, you are unlikely to accurately perceive how long I have existed or will exist. You will not be able to tell, at a glance, if I have recently sat down and stood up or if I am about to.
3. Until we have sufficient reason to think otherwise, we ought to think our experiences are veridical -- they capture how reality is.
4. So until we have sufficient reason to think otherwise, we ought to think objects have many spatial parts and a rich and varied spatial extent but not many temporal parts or a rich and varied temporal extent.

"

by Meghan Sullivan (http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/28943-the-future-of-the-philosophy-of-time/ )

having one classical property is enough for a thing to exist

I have it on good authority that, to put things in terms of properties, interpretations of quantum mechanics would agree that an electron possess mass and total spin (and electronic charge?) before observation. But whether it possess position, momentum, angular momentum, etc. is up to the interpretation.

I'd think having at least one classical property at a given time is enough for a thing to exist at that time.

A conceptual trick is that if a thing (such as a pair of particles in the singlet state) doesn't possess the property of position, then you can't think of it as being contained within space, before observation.

Thus, non-locality isn't a problem, and realism is safe from Bell inequalities. :-)  

There is no non-locality by the Kochen-Specker Theorem

I meant to say 'It's a straightforward consequence of the ontology of H being the same as the ontology of H'' in the previous post 


An electron doesn't have a value of the Kochen-Specker observable before it's measured. The observable is represented by a linear operator in a Hilbert space H'. The same is true for the observable: location. Therefore, an electron doesn't have a location before it's measured/observed/located/collapsed. 


If two particles in the singlet state are represented by a vector in a Hilbert space, then the two particles are not within space (or spacetime) as defined in the measuring apparatus' terms. In this case, their correlation is not non-local, because non-locality is a notion in the terms of the measuring apparatus'  space/spacetime.

Non-locality in Quantum Mechanics is not a Problem for Ontologists

People are still hung up about non-locality. But what if space is just the order-relation among quantum interactions? Then there's no problem. The two famous particles widely separated but having the same x-spin-squared can be correlated because there have been no quantum interactions between the particles, so there is no "space" (or at least distance) between them.

It must be this way because the location of a particle is represented in a Hilbert space H. This has the same ontology as a superposition of an x-spin (or x-spin-squared or whatever) observable that's represented in a Hilbert space H'. Yet an electron doesn't have the property of spin (or at least simultaneous x-spin-squared, y-spin-squared, and z-spin-squared) before it's observed (by the Kochen-Specker theorem).

Therefore, it doesn't possess the property of location, either, until it's observed.

It's a straightforward consequence of the ontology of H' being the same as the ontology of H. (This assumes neither spin nor location is a preferred variable [as happens in some--in my opinion, implausible--interpretations]). The electron doesn't have the property of being within the measuring apparatus' instantiation of space/spacetime(?). So, it would be wrong to suppose there is space(?) or spacetime(?) "between" the two correlated particles. Neither particle has the property of being within the measuring apparatus' spacetime.

I conclude non-locality in quantum mechanics is not a problem for ontologists.

Kochen-Specker and ontology

Classically, you have objects o₁, o₂, .... and each object o_i has properties p_ij. Each property has a value (or at least a magnitude). In quantum mechanics, the situation is different.

If you have an "object" like an electron, it doesn't have a value for a would-be property (Kochen-Specker theorem), even if that property's value is measurable/observable. But you can't have objects that have no properties. Nevertheless, something (at least related to the electron) must exist.

Happily, that something does, in fact, have at least the "property" of obeying Schroedinger's equation (if I interpret Auyang, How is Quantum Field Theory Possible correctly). Apparently, this property is a property 'only up to probability' or 'modulo probability' or whatever you want to call it. I don't know if all such properties are.

I would add that Auyang's property is of a vector in a Hilbert Space H. H is given in the terms/coordinates of a particular measuring apparatus. Thus a third quantum system w (for Wigner) must be able to represent the electron+apparatus system (which generally has more properties than the properties of the electron union the properties of the apparatus) in its terms/coordinates. This is because there is no preferred system, ontologically, among the various quantum systems.

What's the group(-oid?)(??) of transformations specifiable-up-to-probability among the various systems? What kind of network do they form?

What are the transformations between xHy and yH'x ?

In special relativity physical laws must be invariant over frames that are inertially moving relative to each other. In the Relational interpretation, as I see it, physical laws must be invariant over frames that are in a quantum state relative to each other.

Suppose xHy means system x represents system y as a vector in a Hilbert space H. We're after the transformation that preserves the evolution equation and its constant(s), in going from xHy to yH'x, where H and H' have the same dimension.

I'm guessing that, in analogy to special relativity, the transformations are among the parameters of the (quantum) theory. They are time t in some theories, and both space x and time t in most field theories.


I found "Physical Laws Must Be Invariant over Quantum Systems", Phys. Essays 19, 75 (2006). I can't find "On the Relativity of Quantum Superpositions" which came out in Metaphysical Review in the early late middle 90's. The transformations in the former paper may not be right.

Relational Quantum Mechanics from Contextual Ontologies: Notes: leaned up a little

Suppose the x-spin of an electron, e, is going to be measured (in the sense of quantum mechanics) by a measuring apparatus, ma. The electron is represented by a vector 

in a Hilbert Space H_ma, given by

This represents the maximal amount of physical information there is about the electron's x-spin in the measuring apparatus' frame of reference. Equivalently,

represents the maximal amount of physical information there is about the measuring apparatus' magnetic orientation along x in the electron's frame of reference. The electron necessarily instantiates a frame of reference because there is an object there, that exists, for which the rest of the universe must conform to the physical laws.

In either frame, if the measurement can happen at any time, then

I doubt the amplitudes (as opposed to the probabilities) have to be equal, since all we require is coordination upon observation. In this case there's a symmetry involved. Which group it is depends on the evolution (Schoedinger, Dirac, etc.) and the bases.

There is a transformation between the measuring apparatus' frame of reference and the electron's frame of reference that preserves the evolution equation and Plank's constant, exactly analogous to Lorentz transformations among classical but relatively moving frames of reference. (And it's non-trivial since the mass et. al. of the measuring apparatus is larger than the electron's mass.)

There is no such thing as "the" quantum state of the electron. Its "quantum state" depends on the (quantum) frame of reference.

That's how it can be that, for Wigner's friend, Schroedinger's cat is in the superposition

whilst the cat finds itself to be in one of the two classical states

(5) alive, or else, dead

at all times. (The cat's "times". Time is a parameter describing relatively quantum systems, so there is a different time-variable for each system and they are in a particular sense ontologically independent. See previous posts.)

In the cat's frame, Wigner's friend is in the state

Whilst Wigner's friend finds himself to actually be in one of the two states

(7) happy, or else, sad

at all (of his) times.

That's also how, after Wigner's friend opens the box, he can find the cat to be in one of the classical states

(8) alive, or else, dead

and the cat can find Wigner's friend to be in one of the classical states

(9) happy, or else, sad

whilst in Wigner's frame of reference the combined friend-and-cat system is still ("still" in Wigner's time) in the superposition

Note that a system S remains in a quantum state relative to another system O if they represent the other by a vector in a Hilbert space. This is so even if the vector happens to be an eigenvector of a relevant observable. A person observing the results of a Stern-Gerlach experiment does not represent himself as a vector in a Hilbert space (which he would then have to project onto to find the probability of his being in the state he thought he was in? No.)

I wrote up and tried to promulgate these ideas in 1996, independently of Carlo Rovelli.

[... quantum state is intransitive and what exists... the total amount of physical information... at some moment, in a system's own notion of time, does not form an equivalence class...]

Relational Quantum Mechanics from Contextual Ontologies: Notes

There was an inaccuracy added to a previous post: "what exists" in the Relational interpretation is not . Rather, for an electron in e.g.

(1)

represents the maximal amount of physical information there is about the electron's x-spin in the measuring apparatus' frame of reference. Equivalently,

(2)

represents the maximal amount of physical information there is about the measuring apparatus' magnetic orientation along x in the electron's frame of reference. The electron necessarily instantiates a frame of reference because there is an object there that exists for which physical laws must hold.

In either frame, if the measurement can happen at any time then

(3)

I doubt the amplitudes (as opposed to probabilities) have to be equal, in which case there's a symmetry involved. Which group it is depends on the evolution (Schoedinger, Dirac, etc.) and the bases.

There is a transformation between the measuring apparatus' frame of reference and the electron's frame of reference that preserves the evolution equation and Plank's constant, exactly analogous to Lorentz transformations among classical but relatively moving frames. (It's non-trivial since the mass etc. of the measuring apparatus is larger than the electron's mass.)

There is no such thing as "the" quantum state of the electron. Its quantum state depends on the (quantum) frame of reference.

That's how it can be that for Wigner's friend, Schroedinger's cat is in the superposition

(4)

whilst the cat finds itself to be in the classical state

(5) alive, or else, dead

at all "times". 

(Time is a reference frame's parameter describing relatively quantum systems... there is a different ontological time for each system... See previous posts.)

In the cat's frame of reference (or coordinate system, or whatever), Wigner's friend is in the state

(6)

Whilst Wigner's friend finds himself to be happy or sad at all (of his) times.

That is how, after the experiment, Wigner's friend can find the cat the be in one of the classical states

(7) alive, or else, dead

and the cat can find Wigner's friend to be in one of the classical states

(8) happy, or else, sad

whilst in Wigner's frame of reference the combined friend-and-cat system is still ("still" in Wigner's time) in the superposition

(9)

[Where I'm headed with this is roughly: quantum state is intransitive and what exists... the total amount of physical information... at some moment, in a system's own notion of time, does not form an equivalence class...]

the condition (1) I was talking about

(1)  

In some formal systems (1) leads to a hierarchy of conditions

(2)    

...

(3)

  

that in *some* sense are allow for a relatively increasing likelihood of existence. I don't know if there's a strongest set of such conditions for a given axiom system. 

Favorable Logical Form of a theory of everything?

Suppose physicists reach a theory of everything, call it T. We can always ask: why is T the case? If this question is answerable, this answer must lie in the theory itself. The logical form of T must answer the question. It must be the case that in the formal system T it is provable that

(1)  

T implies necessarily (there exists (T))

Then, if T is experimentally shown to express the laws of physics, it would logically imply that the universe must exist. It would be a fact of physics that this universe must exist.

There is apparently no reason for T to exist in the first place, so this is not an explanation for existence.

But if T has form (1) there is some sense in which it, if we knew it described the actual universe, would "retroactively" allow us to conclude that it must exist. e.g. 'existence logically implies it must exist.'

What are the groups G_i associated with symmetries among the objects that T asserts exist? These groups should be found somewhere among the groups of any theory of everything that satisfies (1).

Does the Kochen-Specker theorem imply a contextual ontology?

Does the Kochen-Specker theorem imply a contextual ontology? Yea. Non-locality is not a problem because space is emergent anyway.

Before an electron is observed, what is it that exists?

Before an electron is observed, what is it that exists?

Old Exposition of Wigner's Friend to the Relational Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics argument

I can't find my original paper, so while I rewrite things allow me to quote Steve (he doesn't give a last name) about my paper:

"TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2007

Wigner's Friend and Perspectivist Quantum Theory

As discussed at the end of the last post in my series on quantum mechanics, I want to explore the ideas contained in Paul Merriam’s recent paper to see if his proposal for “quantum relativity” can address the challenges faced by the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. But first I want to double back a bit by looking at Merriam’s previous (1997) paper on the philosophy of QM: called “On the Relativity of Quantum Superpositions,” it was included in an edition of an online journal called Metaphysical Review.

In this paper Merriam independently (to all appearances) arrived at the same general position as in the relational interpretation primarily identified with Carlo Rovelli. He also began to explore the idea of using relativity theory as a guide to further development of the relational view. To lay the groundwork, the paper begins by invoking the “Wigner’s friend” scenario and showing how it leads to the view he described as “Perspectivist Quantum Theory”.


Eugene Wigner, to highlight a certain aspect of quantum theory, presented an idealized thought experiment (a short account of this written by Henry Stapp can be found here). In the “Wigner’s friend” scenario, an experimenter (the friend) is performing a measurement on a quantum system that will result in one of two outcomes: the original example invokes an atomic state that will emit a visible photon either into the eye of the experimenter or elsewhere (Merriam’s paper imports Schrödinger’s’ cat into his version). A second experimenter (Wigner) is stationed outside the sealed laboratory where the measurement will take place. Inside the laboratory, from the perspective of Wigner’s friend, the experiment will collapse the quantum state into one of the two outcomes and the friend will observe the photon or not. To Wigner on the outside, the physical description of the state in the lab will be a superposition of the two scenarios, where the friend observes the photon and where she does not.

Wigner used the thought experiment to support his view that human consciousness was intimately bound up with quantum measurement: for him, it might make sense to view the two outcomes in the lab as being in superposition if the measurement was performed by an inanimate apparatus of some kind, but he believed that the consciousness of the human friend would have engendered collapse whether or not the he (the second observer) made contact with the situation in the lab. However, there is no part of quantum theory itself which makes any such special provision for human consciousness.

Merriam wants to take QM seriously as a description of nature, and notes the theory itself says nothing about applying only to microscopic or simple or non-conscious systems. QM doesn’t magically dissolve into classical reality at some objective threshold (there is no “Heisenberg cut”). The states of what’s happening inside the lab as known to Wigner and Wigner’s frienddiffer. This difference cannot be “swept under the rug”. What the Wigner’s friend example is telling us is that QM gives a true physical description relative to the observing/measuring system. “What prediction is made depends on which system is doing the predicting.” Quantum states are well defined only when relativized to a particular system. Quantum theory is an intransitive theory.

Next Merriam considers a comparison of this situation to that of relativity theory: “A quantum description of the state of the system is relative to the system doing the describing just as the description of a system in terms of space and time is relative to the motion (and gravity) of the describing system”. The question is whether we can build on this analogy in a useful way.

In considering the situation, note again that there is no reason to think QM is anything other than “democratic” in nature (my label). As Merriam says: “In QM, there is no ‘ontological’ difference between an experimenter and an electron…” From the point of view of the electron, the experimenter is in superposition between interactions. The next move is to postulate that Quantum Mechanics holds for the points of view of all quantum systems. We then note that while quantum states viewed from different points of view will differ, the perspectives of two systems must match up when they interact. The theory to be developed must be based ultimately on the interactions between systems. The interactions are the pivot to link things together. (This is a point stressed by Rovelli: the interactions are the fundamental entities; quantum states lack objective existence). So, we have a situation where we postulate that QM gives correct physical descriptions from a point of view, but there is a plurality of points of view. A theory of quantum relativity would note that “simultaneity” means two concurrent observations involving the same observer. Since systems’ perspective will match during an interaction, this may form the basis of extending the theory. For instance, the time interval between two succeeding interactions between two systems must match.

It is with this point that the paper ends. Merriam presses the idea of quantum relativity further in the next paper, which I will discuss in a further post."

http://guidetoreality.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html

I basically argued from Wigner's friend to the Relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, independently of Carlo Rovelli. It got "published" in an online journal Metaphysical Review in 1997(?), but the journal stopped and apparently is not archived on the net. I'll post more about Relationalism and ontology soon-ish.

In contextual ontologies existence is not an equivalence class

In a contextual ontology (see previous posts) the things that exist relative to an object x do *not* form an equivalence class.

y exists relative to x if y is in immediate physical contact with x.

This solves some problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics. I'll post about it in the next few days.

I'm assuming relational quantum mechanics, where the state of a system is "related to" or "relative to" the reference system. Think Wigner's Friend.

Relativity does *not* compel the block universe.

Relativity does *not* compel the block universe. Motl said it very succinctly:

"What the possibility to cut the bread [block] in different directions means is that for a distant extraterrestrial cyclist, all spacelike-separated regions of spacetime are equally real from his perspective and they may include events on Earth which belong to our past, present, as well as future. But that doesn't mean that the reality of the past, present, and future on Earth has to enjoy the same "reality status" from our perspective."

--Lubos Motl on one of Brian Green's errors in "The Illusion of Time" from "The Fabric of the Cosmos" series.

Consistent mathematical definitions of McTaggart's A- and B- series

Consistent mathematical definitions of McTaggart's A- and B- series

Here are consistent definitions of McTaggart's A-series and B-series. [refs.?] This does not address the question of whether a mathematical representation of time is sufficient to capture everything we know about time.

Let T be a timeline: a set of lineraly-ordered elements (which represent moments of time, or the state of the universe at moments of time, it doesn't matter), and T is isomorphic to the real numberline. Let t1, t2, ... be variables that range over all times t in T.

Start with the B-series. Define a (transitive) two-place relation B = _B_, such that for each pair of distinct times t1, t2, we have

(1) t1Bt2 if and only if t1 happens before t2

The A-series is more subtle. As McTaggart famously noted, an element t1 of T cannot be past, present, and future, simultaneously.

One may start by picking some one time t1 in T, and declaring it present. t1 is now(?...). Then all the times t2 before it (in the B-series) are past and all times t3 after it (in the B-series) are future. These assignments are a particular (homomorphic) map Mt1:{past, present, future} to T.

The twist is that, given that the moment or time that is present is (the value of the variable) t1, we need more, since other moments need time to be present as well, when it's their turn, in the linear ordering.

Perhaps the most natural thing to do is to construct a map like Mt1 for each time in T. For each time t in T we have the map Mt:{past, present, future} to T such that t is present, times before it are past and times after it are future. Then the set S of all maps Mt, S = {Mt for all t in T}, is a consistent assignment of (many of) each of the A-states (past, present, and future) to each time t in T. In this sense McTaggart was wrong: each time t is associated with past by some maps Mt', present by some Mt'', and future by the remaining Mt'''. You have to pick which time t is present. Since there is no reason to pick one time over another (so far as the mathematical representation is concerned) we needed the set of all homomorphic maps (past, present, and future) to T.

Conversely, one can start with the A-series and derive the B-series (or B-relation. I take a relation to be defined ultimately in terms of sets). Basically, if variable t4's future is a subset of variable t5's future, then t4 is after t5, i.e. t5Bt4. The point is the B-series (relation) can be defined in terms of the A-series. Therefore

(2) The mathematical structure of the A-series and the mathematical structure of the B-series can be defined in terms of each other.

The question is whether a mathematical representation of time is sufficient to capture everything we know about time.

Is information added by adding motion to a worldline?

Start with a worldline as in relativity. This is static. But then imagine a point representing "now" moving along the worldline.

The question is, have we added any information by adding the moving point?

Does meta-time add information to the model?

Here's the worldline of a particle in a Spacetime Diagram:

(1)  [typical spacetime diagram]

The units of t are seconds and the units of x are meters.

A problem with the diagram is that it treats time as ontologically the same as space. Many philosophers of time hold that time, whatever it is, is not just another dimension of space.

How does one impart actual change ("superseconds" or "qualitative seconds" or "Kairos" or etc.) to this ontology? So suppose we modify the Spacetime Diagram above to one with a "meta time" (it's a kind of "SpaceSuperTime Diagram"):

(2) [same diagram but with a selected point moving along the (static) worldline in a time t' (tangent to the curve)]

This this diagram we imagine that the particle is moving along the static worldline, in a kind of meta-time I've called t'.

The question is, does the second diagram add any information to the first?