Modal Interpretations of the Knowledge Argument and the Temporal Knowledge Argument

Modal Interpretations of the Knowledge Argument and Time

Two modal interpretations of the Knowledge Argument are

1. "McConnell (1994) defends the more radical view that the acquisition of knowing-how is normally accompanied by the acquisition of a particular new item of knowing-that." (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

So Mary has one mode of knowing before she leaves the room, and two modes of knowing after leaving the room.

2. "White (2007) argues against Loar that the [materialist] account cannot explain the a posteriori character of mind-brain identity statements in a satisfying manner."

I. e. One can have knowledge of forms like "if pain p feels like such and such then Qp".

Two modal interpretations of the Temporal Knowledge Argument are

1. Mark has one mode of knowing before he leaves the room, the B times, and two modes of knowing after leaving the room (the B times, the B times and the genuine change of the A-series), Mctaggart (1908).

2. the A-theorist can have knowledge of forms like "if time t is present then Pt".